“America First 2.0”: Implications for the Liberal International Order and Australia’s Strategic Outlook


Dr. Luis da Vinha
Lecturer in Politics and International Relations
De Montfort University, UK


POLICY PERSPECTIVES #17, November 2024 | PENDING DOI

Donald Trump’s re-election as President in the 2024 U.S. election cements his role as one of the most impactful figures in modern American politics. Regardless of opinions on his domestic policy record, Trump’s greatest impact will likely be his significant shift in U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Trump’s foreign policy in his second term – labelled “America First 2.0” – aims to finalise the overhaul of the international order established by U.S. policymakers since World War II.

U.S. and Post-War International Order

After playing a major role in defeating the Axis powers in Europe and the Pacific, a post-war U.S. shifted its focus to the Soviet Union and the global spread of communism. To address this threat and protect its global interests, American policymakers developed a containment strategy to block Soviet influence in key industrial regions. This strategy involved a substantial increase in U.S. military capabilities, ensuring material dominance over the Soviet Union and its allies. However, policymakers in Washington recognised the value of promoting U.S. interests and legitimacy through international institutions.

Consequently, the U.S. led the establishment of a variety of institutions -including the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which integrated nations into a system aligned with American values and interests.

These institutions formed the cornerstone of the American-led international order – the set of established rules and institutions that govern state interactions. Like the Soviet-led communist bloc, the “liberal international order” (LIO), often called the “rules-based order,” was hierarchical, with U.S. hegemony establishing superordinate and subordinate relationships among its members. However, the LIO also had features of a constitutional order, organised around consent, reciprocity, and agreed-upon rules and institutions that shaped state behavior, including that of the U.S. This structure legitimized U.S. influence, creating what has been called an “empire by invitation.” Every American administration since WWII adopted policies that consolidated the LIO. The Cold War’s end offered a chance to globalise the LIO, allowing the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO to promote principles of internationalism, free trade, multilateralism, multiculturalism, and (liberal) democracy worldwide. Although criticism of this order grew over time, American unipolarity facilitated the LIO’s expansion, placing the U.S. at the centre of global governance.

Trump’s “America First” Agenda

Trump entered office with an “America First” agenda, rejecting the principles and institutions of the LIO, and focusing on U.S. sovereignty and unilateralism. Despite his intention to completely redefine U.S. foreign policy, Trump encountered significant obstacles. Some of his strongest opposition came from within, as several senior officials tried to change Trump’s views on the U.S. role in the world and convince him of the importance of maintaining America’s global military, intelligence, and diplomatic commitments.

Today’s context is more conducive to Trump fully implementing his vision. Trump and his team now have four years of executive experience, deeper insight into the policymaking landscape, and an administration of loyalists committed to his agenda. The Republican Party has become more aligned with Trump’s policies and his calls for conformity. This administration also has at its disposal a clearer strategy and specific policies, positioning it to “hit the ground running.” Empowered by a popular mandate, Trump’s confidence is further supported by the 2024 Supreme Court ruling affirming his “absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority.”

In his first term, Trump challenged the LIO framework, renouncing “globalism” and withdrawing from multiple international agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Paris Climate Agreement, Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, UN Human Rights Council, and UNESCO. He criticised traditional allies and even questioned U.S. commitments to NATO, Japan, and South Korea.

“America First 2.0” will likely further dismantle America’s postwar international order. Although the 2024 GOP platform states intentions to “strengthen alliances,” Trump’s emphasis on national sovereignty and transactional approach to foreign policy will further weaken multilateral cooperation. Instead of fostering negotiation and compromise, the Trump administration’s concept of “peace through strength” will prioritise unilateral solutions that overlook allies’ needs. Proposed policies on Ukraine, the current Middle East conflict, and a renewed withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement signal that Trump will prioritise narrow U.S. interests over allied collaboration.

Another key element of the LIO, the international trade regime, will also face substantial setbacks. The Trump administration’s protectionist measures in its first term included tariffs on over US$380 billion of trade with China, sparking retaliatory tariffs and trade tensions. Trump’s proposal for a universal import tariff could impact over US$3 trillion in trade, potentially shrinking global output by 0.8% in 2025 and 1.3% in 2026, sparking more tit-for-tat responses, and hastening global economic decoupling.

Moreover, “America First 2.0” could accelerate the trend toward global autocratisation as U.S. promotion of democracy and human rights takes a backseat. Trump’s second term will likely strengthen illiberal regimes and advocates worldwide, undermining the fragile international human rights framework.

What Does This Mean for Australia?

Countries like Australia will face new challenges in managing their relationships with the Trump administration. Trump’s proposed tariffs could reduce Australia’s economic growth by 0.8% (AU$ 19 billion) to 1.5% (AU$ 36 billion) and drive inflation and interest rates higher.

Additionally, “America First 2.0” will test the strength of the alliance. The new American administration may review some of the conditions of the AUKUS partnership. The agreement established that, among other commitments, the U.S. would sell three to five Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to Australia and provide assistance for Australia to build three to five additional SSNs. However, the Trump administration may choose to adopt an “alternative division-of-labor approach” in which U.S. submarines would be stationed in Australia and operated by the U.S. Navy, while Australia focuses on building other military capabilities for non-submarine missions. While the option merits consideration, the uncertainty of America’s commitment to its allies’ security will undoubtedly raise concerns in Australia.

This is all the more worrisome since we find ourselves enmeshed in a growing international rivalry between the U.S. and China. Moreover, the alliance with U.S. can potentially encumber Canberra’s diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, as declining trust and confidence in America may lead regional leaders to increasingly opt for hedging strategies that would ultimately favour Beijing.

Canberra will need to reassess its strategic options. While Trump’s foreign policy approach has been controversial, it is notably predictable, especially regarding international relations. Therefore, in this period of increasing regional defence budgets, Australia should bolster its defence capabilities and deepen partnerships with other regional powers like Japan and South Korea to help balance regional threats. Australia might also take advantage of U.S. foreign policy shifts to increase its leadership role within the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the Pacific Islands Forum, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

“America First 2.0” may signal the end of the LIO. However, it also offers an opportunity for Australia and other like-minded liberal democracies to take a more active role in reshaping the institutions and rules that will underpin the future international order. By stepping into leadership roles, these countries can collaborate to uphold and redefine principles of multilateralism, democratic governance, and rule-based cooperation.

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